Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe
Larry M Bartels
Princeton University Press, £25

RECENT fringe Tory events by the nascent Conservative Democratic Organisation (CDO) and the National Conservatism Conference offer striking examples of an observation at the heart of Larry Bartels’ brilliant analysis.

For they illustrate not only the panicky shift rightwards of a party facing an existential crisis, but also how and why prominent figures in a “mainstream” organisation flirt with what we broadly define as populism in ways that do not chime with the prevailing popular mood.

After all, the CDO is merely a revivalist Johnson sect stuffed with the usual suspects, and the NatCons are an ugly bunch appealing to Europe’s most notorious far-right demagogues.

But what these events demonstrate above all is just how out of touch Conservative parliamentarians have become, not only with many of their own party members, but more importantly with average voters.

This gulf between politicians and public opinion is the central focus of Bartels, a distinguished social scientist whose influential career has been determined by a fastidious loyalty to a simple virtue: empirical evidence.

He uses attitudinal surveys in Europe to unpick the notion that a “crisis of democracy” represented by the anti-politics of populists in the vein of Viktor Orban in Hungary and Matteo Salvini in Italy derives from rightward-shifting public sentiment.

Alarm at this notional crisis has animated thinkers for decades, but in recent years the rise of the European far right, Johnson’s Brexit and, further afield, Trumpian intolerance, has induced a form of collective liberal hysteria about the public embrace of extremism. 

Yet the hard facts demonstrate nothing of the sort, argues Bartels, who offers cause for confidence in the integrity of your average citizen by comparison with your average politician.

The author uses evidence of public opinion in Europe before, during and after the 2008 financial meltdown, ostensibly a driver of the populist turn by eroding citizens’ faith in democracy, to suggest a more prosaic reality.

On most metrics, this shows remarkably consistent and satisfied attitudes towards the democratic status quo.

If there is a crisis of democracy, the evidence shows emphatically that it is not attributable to the hardening views of citizens on issues such as immigration or European integration.

The author writes: “If Europe is experiencing a crisis of democracy, most Europeans seem not to have gotten the message.”

By contrast, the data place anti-democratic trends firmly at the feet of elites. Bartels provides a convincing account of a crisis of toxic politics, policy failures and democratic backsliding that can be attributed “overwhelmingly” to the political class.

This suggests both that the surge in support for right-wing populist parties has been exaggerated — and the evidence suggests it has — but also that “political entrepreneurs” have cynically tapped into what broad sympathy there may be for populist ideas for their own gain.

The successes of Ukip, Vox in Spain and Lega in Italy cannot be put down to a significant increase in right-wing populist sentiment, rather they “seem to be due mostly, in varying degrees, to charismatic leadership, over-the-top media coverage, and the stumbles and scandals of mainstream competitors.”

The implications of Bartels’ work are profound, adding heavy empirical weight to longstanding scepticism among some political theorists about the “folk” conception of democracy that exalts a spiritual “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”

He writes: “The myth of rule by the people implies that bad attitudes, rash choices, or insufficient diligence in fulfilling the obligations of citizenship must constitute a crisis of democracy.”

Many of us will instinctively recognise the alternative view he offers that blames political elites.

It provides solace for the democratic left, whose hunger for reform extends beyond parties and personalities to political processes and institutional structures.

It is also an essential prerequisite, Bartels suggests, for overcoming the distorting impact of the “folk theory” in order not just to better understand democracy per se, but to remain vigilant as to how leaders exploit public opinion in ways that can threaten it.