THE four-day truce and prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas is a blessed respite from the daily nightmare of death and destruction being visited on Gaza — and will come as a huge relief to the families of hostages and prisoners alike.
But for thousands of Palestinians using the temporary silence of the guns to visit bombed-out homes, schools and hospitals, it is accompanied by the agony of confirmation that loved ones are dead. Thousands more remain trapped in uncertainty, blocked by Israel’s invading army from checking on flattened neighbourhoods for the bodies of relatives or friends.
The pause is not enough. It must be turned into a real ceasefire.
And this truce could have come sooner. Nearly a month ago families of the hostages taken by Hamas met Benjamin Netanyahu and called for an “everyone for everyone” deal, the release of all hostages by Hamas in exchange for the huge number of Palestinians in Israeli jails.
Over a million Palestinians have been arrested by the occupying power since 1967. Two in five Palestinian men have spent time behind bars. And the number of prisoners has doubled since the Hamas attacks of October 7.
Instead, Netanyahu has doubled down on war, at a cost so far of over 14,000 Palestinian lives.
Thousands of the dead are known to be children. Whether Hamas has been significantly damaged is less clear.
Despite Tel Aviv’s stated determination to “wipe out” the group, Palestinians of all parties perceive the war as one against them as a people, not against Hamas.
Exiled Hamas leader Ali Barakeh, interviewed by the Financial Times, admitted blandly that a ground invasion suits it since it is much easier to inflict casualties on Israel than during bombing raids: “We are able to face an urban war more easily than an air war.” Even if it loses large numbers of fighters, the huge civilian death toll is the most effective recruiting sergeant Hamas could hope for.
Allies of Netanyahu have called for full ethnic cleansing of Gaza, and aspects of Israel’s strategy (like the order to evacuate the north of the Strip) suggest such an aim. But global pressure has forced this truce, suggesting the United States is following an older playbook: facilitate Israel’s violence until the international uproar is deafening, then press for a halt.
Washington’s position is delicate. If Israel isn’t seen to win against Hamas, the prestige of its superpower protector takes a hit. But outrage at Israel’s war crimes also risks accelerating the shift of Middle Eastern powers out of the US orbit and towards China, visible already in traditional US allies Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates joining the Brics.
Even so, we cannot discount Israel pursuing the ethnic cleansing of Gaza despite US unease.
The steady colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem has never let up, and the march of Israeli politics to the far right is evident when self-proclaimed fascists like Bezalel Smotrich sit in cabinet.
This is the causative factor in today’s war, despite efforts by some to assign equal blame to the Israeli occupying power and Hamas.
Hamas’s extremism is real but reactive: leaving aside Netanyahu’s admission in 2019 that “bolstering Hamas” was “part of our strategy” to keep Palestine divided, it is clear that Israel’s relentless transformation of “facts on the ground” to render a Palestinian state unviable is what provokes fundamentalist opposition to compromise in return.
Many in Israel understand this: the newspaper Ha’aretz put the blame for the October 7 massacre squarely on Netanyahu within 24 hours. We must hope that this truce gives space to the huge opposition to Netanyahu we have seen on Israel’s streets all year to demand his removal, and to a recognition that the question of Palestinians’ right to their own state must be resolved before Israel itself can enjoy democracy or peace.
