THE 20th congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has made headlines in the mainstream media, but hardly because China’s future is of great consequence for the future of the world — rather, all eyes have been on Xi Jinping’s continuing as general secretary into a third five-year term.  

What an opportunity, so the pundits think, to hype up the new cold war, spotlighting China’s “dictatorial” methods of leadership succession as against the West’s virtues of democratic choice.

Xi is being “anointed,” we are told, or “crowned,” as China’s leader.  

When, following the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, the CPC introduced the two-term limit on the leadership position to guard against new personality cults, this was widely welcomed as a step forward in democratising the party.  

In 2018, however, the limit was removed — at which point Western political elites gave up hope of integrating China into the existing global system under their dominance.

Of course, China’s centralised system has cultural and historical roots going back millennia. However, these traditions were profoundly transformed after 1949 by the CPC practice of democratic centralism — of top-down, bottom-up processes of decision-making.

The CPC has nevertheless gone through various phases of tightening and relaxing control: it is important then to understand why, at this time, the party is once again tightening its grip, seeking to consolidate power under a single leadership figure.

External conditions

Since Barack Obama’s 2011 “pivot to Asia,” the US has progressively applied both military and economic pressure not only to block China’s growing global influence as it expands peacefully, for example through the Belt and Road Initiative, but also, beyond containment, to aggressively enforce technological and economical decoupling.  

Under Joe Biden, the US has effectively pledged to do everything it can to obstruct China’s further development while mobilising all possible global forces and resources in preparation for a war over Taiwan.  

All this at a time when the country is undergoing fundamental changes in its social and economic structures.

Economic restructuring

China is in the midst of a huge qualitative transformation in its mode of development, moving from a low-wage, labour-intensive, export-driven economy to one that is innovation-led and green, with greater emphasis on domestic consumption.

This involves a shift to entirely new pillars of growth — from the traditional energy-intensive iron, steel, coal and cement industries to new strategic industries at the world’s technological frontiers as well as to services, looking to a low-carbon future.  

Scientific and technological breakthroughs are crucial to future success and the disorderly development of capitalism must be checked as an entirely new type of capital market serving socialism is developed.  

This upgrading and restructuring of the economy risks social instability: it requires close management to avoid mistakes and crises so as to stay on course.  

Lessons from Gorbachev: maintaining internal political strength

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s failure lay in pursuing economic and political reforms simultaneously, so opening the USSR to liberal democratic influence at a time of structural economic change. The USSR ended not with military defeat: it was effectively dismantled from within through the West’s ideological subversion.

The loss of overall military as well as political control is not a mistake the CPC intends to make, hence its consolidation of power as Xi retains both his political and military leadership positions. The CPC’s emphasis on Marxism and socialist principles further denies the US any leverage to interfere.

The US has finally come to the realisation that the CPC cannot be overturned. But if regime change is not an option, what of the possibility of replacing Xi with a more pro-market, less authoritarian, less nationalistic leadership, more prepared to accept US leadership of the international order?  

Calculating that Xi’s statist approach to the economy is alienating the liberal wing of the party, which feels China is forfeiting international opportunities, while a conservative nationalist wing remains critical of Xi for taking too many risks and provoking Washington, US strategists are banking on efforts to foment factions within the party.

By applying maximum pressure while consolidating a military and economic bloc of allies, these strategists think that China will see that the direction of the world is stacked against it — that there is no way its global ambitions can be achieved.  

At the same time, if Xi could be provoked to overplay his hand and take unnecessary risks, this would reinforce international opprobrium and alienate the Chinese middle classes.

Problems of factionalism

The CPC, like any political party, is made up of different factions. Xi’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, managed to maintain a stable balance between the two most powerful networks — the “Shanghai clique” and the “youth league faction.”

However, a power struggle erupted in 2012 just before the 18th party congress with the emergence of Bo Xilai, CPC secretary for the major city of Chongqing, as a rival to Xi, who was standing to be leader for the first time.  

Bo was something of a populist and a wild card who gained wide attention through his promotion of egalitarian values in the style of the Cultural Revolution’s red culture. His removal — he was later imprisoned for corruption — helped prevent factional infighting from spiralling out of control.

Xi became party leader but the experience was a deep shock to China’s political system. He was subsequently to criticise his predecessors for “lax and weak governance,” which he considered had “enabled inaction and corruption to spread within the party and led to serious problems in its political environment.”  

Xi himself rose through the party ranks without any particular factional affiliation and from 2012 the success of his tough anti-corruption campaigns in breaking up party cliques, weakening factionalism and promoting appointment based on merit have greatly strengthened democracy within the organisation.

China’s socialist advance

China is advancing along its journey to develop into a modern socialist country by 2049.  The US knows this. Biden waited until the 20th CPC congress to publish his National Security Strategy, focusing squarely on China as the “most consequential geopolitical challenge.”  

The US political elite intends to win: the Pentagon has just claimed new powers to throw billions more dollars into weapons procurement. At the same time, Biden has chosen this moment to launch a full-blown economic war so as to isolate China’s entire hi-tech sector and cut off future growth. The gloves of the US engagement policy are finally off.

But as the US advances to the brink of actual war, it comes face to face with a 96 million-strong column of CPC members determined to resist. Under the intense pressure, the CPC congress has struck a confident note. Xi’s “authoritarian turn” is keeping China on a steady course, united in purpose while remaining flexibly committed, in Xi’s words, to the principle of “letting 100 flowers bloom and 100 schools of thought contend.”  

At a time of growing political chaos as the world’s dominant ruling classes flail about amid multiple crises, the 20th CPC congress stands out as an example of orderliness and clarity of direction. China’s journey represents the continuity of socialist revolutions reaching back to 1917; its success is vital for the future of socialism in the world as a whole.

Jenny Clegg is a writer and researcher specialising in China’s development and foreign policy.