MANY commentators on both the left and right have been quick to look beyond some key facts relating to the Bolivian coup that ousted Evo Morales in what most have described as “disputed elections,” showing haste to “move on” while perhaps “learning some lessons.”  

To shed some light on what actually occurred let’s look at some of those key facts.

Fact 1: A week before the election, Bolivia’s electoral authority (TSE) publicly reported the process it would follow: that it would report the quick vote results when they reached at least 80 per cent.  

This is exactly what it did, making a public announcement when the quick vote reached 83.85 per cent.  

Quick vote reports then stopped — as they had in previous elections — so as not to create confusion with the official count that had commenced.  

Fact 2: Pressure was then applied, by both the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the opposition to continue reporting the unofficial quick vote, alluding to the “suspension” as a cause for concern, but as Fact 1 above states: a pre-election publicly stated process was followed. 

The OAS had not criticised this approach on previous occasions — processes it had praised.

Whether premeditated or opportunistic, this was the crucial moment seized upon by the opposition — there was now sufficient confusion to enable the opposition and media to misrepresent this as a “delay/suspension” of the quick vote.  

This stoked the accusation of fraud and placed Morales’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) and election officials in a very difficult position: if they stuck to their guns and waited to report only on the official vote they would be accused of blocking results and seen to be increasing delays.  

If, however, they succumbed to pressure to report quick results and the gap between parties was either roughly the same or MAS was leading, the accusation would be that the delay was needed to rig the vote in favour of MAS.  

If the opposition was leading, then the delay would have been due to the need to rig the vote in favour of MAS: they could not win.

Fact 3: The day after the election the TSE bowed to pressure and released a second report on the quick results. 

MAS increased its vote share from just under 8 per cent to just over 10 per cent and was on course to win with the 10 per cent margin necessary to avoid a run-off.

Fact 4: This was consistent with pre-election polling, the trajectory of results coming in and the fact that the majority of late results come from rural areas that are most likely to vote for MAS. 

Fact 5: These were all unofficial quick vote results.

Fact 6: Despite a heightened state of tension, the OAS did not wait for the official election result to publicly dispute the result. 

Despite calling for calm, this was the trigger for an eruption of already simmering violence and the catalyst for the opposition to accuse fraud.  

Fact 7: Official results were consistent with the quick vote that gave MAS the 10 per cent lead it needed to avoid a second vote run-off.

Fact 8: The main opposition candidate, Carlos Mesa, refused to accept the official election result and an MAS proposal for the OAS to conduct an independent audit.  

MAS agreed to accept the results of the audit and following the audit, a recommendation to rerun the election.

Fact 9: Morales was forced from office due to threats from the military against him directly as well as kidnappings and acts of violence against other MAS officials.

Why would Morales resign when he had agreed to a rerun and believed he had won the first election by a clear majority so would likely win again? 

Conversely, why would the opposition not agree to an independent OAS recommendation to rerun the election if it thought it had won or was in a strong position for securing a second vote run-off?

Both the quick and official vote showed a clear margin of victory for MAS. 

Even taken at the point the quick vote ceased (just under 8 per cent) MAS had won the popular vote by a margin that was highly unlikely to be achieved through fraud.  

The official vote showed a clear winner consistent with pre-election polling. Is this the real reason why opposition parties were so adamant there could not be an election rerun?  

A Washington-based think tank, the Centre for Economic Policy Research, has questioned both the assumptions and findings from the OAS audit — providing evidence that the OAS ignored established guidance and best practice on interpreting quick votes.  

Notwithstanding the multitude of wider criticisms targeted at Morales, some valid, others more dubious — and I will touch on a few below — using these as a means to justify what happened in this election makes no sense and only supports the case that there is inadequate evidence of fraud: why focus on wider criticisms if there is clear evidence of fraud?

Commentators on both the left and right have been quick to blame Morales for unprecedented Amazon fires and deforestation.  

There have been widespread fires in the Bolivian Amazon this year, partly due to Morales’s strategy to further diversify the economy through deals with powerful agribusiness, compounded by severe drought and an escalating global climate crisis.  

It is right that such policies should be criticised by indigenous and environmental groups. These are serious dilemmas arising in the course of development far from unique to the Bolivian context, but have Mesa and opposition supporters suddenly abandoned their support heartland of Santa Cruz’s industrial agribusiness in favour of trees and tribal Amazonian cultures? 

It is obvious that these issues are being cynically exploited to undermine Morales rather than being an attempt to resolve them.  

Others point to a politicised state bureaucracy and the alliances that have enabled MAS to carry out the reforms and maintain stability that has enabled the redistribution of wealth to those that need it most. 

Evidence of his dictatorial tendencies, surely? Whatever the criticisms — again, some fair and others not — this cannot be used as justification for his downfall: it was the coup, not a majority of the voting public rising up against this “tyranny” that ousted Morales.  

To portray it otherwise is disingenuous. Of course, there have been instances of corruption and mistakes have been made — Bolivia is the poorest nation in South America — a continent with corruption on a gargantuan scale.  

But the fundamental question is: have the changes implemented by Morales helped improve the lives of the poorest while reducing the levels of corruption that ultimately led to the privatisation of rainwater?  

When issues are reframed and the questions asked from a different perspective, the nature of the forces that led to the coup becomes clearer.  

Indeed, in the midst of disgusting racism and a potential full-blown military dictatorship, it hasn’t taken long for their true colours to emerge.  

This is not an excuse or a eulogisation of everything Morales achieved (and there is much). It is a plea to focus on the facts.  

Although some of the negative aspects of Morales’s approach might have begun to erode popular support and could have in the future contributed to the end of this amazing journey, they were not at this time the cause of Morales’s downfall — a coup was.

Always remember that Bolivia under Morales’s leadership defied the neoliberal order and showed that another way was not only possible but markedly better.  

For those who have always seen Morales as a threat to the established neoliberal order, there would never be an acceptable compromise.  

This was the threat that ultimately needed to be stamped out. Normal service resumed? Hopefully those who have benefited — and there are many — will have other ideas. 

I would like to acknowledge the great work that CEPR have undertaken to help me be able to put this story out.